The automobile sector is often presented as the archetypal global industry. In this view, the car business is one of the main drivers behind the homogenisation of the world, both because of firms' internationalisation strategies (mergers-acquisitions, establishment of facilities in emerging countries, world cars, international division of labour, etc.) and also as a result of the social practices such firms enact via their organisation of work and at the lifestyle (automobile civilisation) level. The present article is an attempt to deconstruct a representation that neglects the heterogeneity of firms and spaces; the great diversity of the strategies being pursued; and the inherent contradictions of the competitive process. Without purporting to analyse carmakers' internationalisation strategies in their entirety (cf., Freyssenet, Shimizu, Volpato forthcoming; Jetin, 2001) , it delves into issues relating to those regionalisation strategies that carmakers are most likely to follow in their attempts to rebuild at a regional (supranational) level a modicum of coherency between productive systems and automobile markets -coherencies that no longer necessarily materialise at the national level that had once (during the post-war boom years) been the arena within which they could regulate themselves.
To apprehend the dynamics of regional integration, emphasis is placed on actors' (the firms') strategies and their close interaction with certain political and institutional elements (Boyer, 1999) . In the current historical context, "regionalisation" is construed as a structuring of the world-space into various regions that are distinct both from the globalisation (homogenisation) process and from earlier and partial/parallel "regional integration" processes. The present paper does not use an institutional definition of regional integration (c.f., chapter 2 by Denis Audet and Rob van Tulder), rather it sees the regional integration process as one component of an automobile firm's spatial management strategy. The two aspects (institutional/strategic) clearly interact with one another: firms' strategies respond and/or are involved in the development of an institutional compromise between sovereign States, and inter-governmental agreements can sometimes cause firms to make new choices. The first section of the present paper reviews the fundamental elements involved in analysing profit strategies and productive models in an attempt to specify the issues at stake, as well as the way in which such strategies and models participate in carmakers' forms of internationalisation. This analytical matrix (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000b) will be applied in the following sections. The second section provides a historical perspective, reminding the reader of the greater or lesser extent to which carmakers have been involved in the partial regional integration processes that ran from the 1960s until the advent of the new globalisation events that were so intimately associated with the 1990s. Lastly, the final section of the article is an attempt to analyse the regionalisation process in its contemporary form, seen as an ongoing process which involves a rebuilding of spaces of regulation -and as one that is diametrically opposed to the phenomenon of globalisation.
Growth modes, profit strategies and productive models
An analysis of carmakers' trajectories and performances over the course of the 20 th century has allowed us to renew our understanding of the two essential conditions that are a prerequisite for profitability. The first is the relevancy of the "profit strategy" to the "growth mode" that typifies the countries in which the firm is deploying its activities. The second is the "company government compromise" that exists between a firm's principal protagonists, a meeting of the minds that enables actors to implement means that are coherent with the profit strategy being pursued -in other words, to invent or adopt a "productive model" (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000b) . Profit strategies are combinations of profit sources in compatible proportions. Basically there are six sources of profit: economies of scale, diverse offerings, guarantee of quality, innovation, productive flexibility and permanent cost reduction. Until now, there have been no examples of firms exploiting all of these profit sources simultaneously and with the same level of intensity. This is due to the contradictory nature of the sources' pre-conditions and means of implementation. For this reason, firms must choose amongst possible combinations of profit sources, unless they can invent ways of overcoming contradictions as General Motors was able to do during the Inter-War period when it created compatibility between volume and diversity. Today five different profit strategies can be observed in the automobile sector. They are called volume; volume and diversity; quality; permanent cost reduction; and innovation and flexibility.
Profit strategies do not all possess the same degree of relevancy in time and in space. Their appropriateness depends on the market and labour factor structures that characterise the different national modes of growth. These growth modes are not infinite in number and several countries may at any point in time be applying the same one (Boyer, Saillard, 1995) . They are divided into three main categories: growth modes with a national income distribution that is nationally co-ordinated and moderately hierarchised; growth modes with a competitive type of distribution; and growth modes with an inegalitarian type of distribution. These categories are subsequently subdivided according to the main driver of the growth: investment, consumption or export. The success of an internationalisation policy is therefore predicated first and foremost on the relevancy of the firm's profit strategy to the growth mode(s) of the new countries which it is entering (Boyer, Freyssenet, 1999; Freyssenet, Lung, 2000) .
Profit strategies cannot be implemented with just any available means. Each has certain requirements that the firm's actors must satisfy through a product policy, productive organisation and employment relationship that are coherent and acceptable to them. The creation of an acceptable type of coherency between these various means infers the building of a company government compromise between the firm's main actors (executives, shareholders, banks, employees, labour unions, suppliers, etc.) . The means used to implement one and the same profit strategy can therefore differ from one another if this is needed to satisfy the aforementioned requirements. As such, the firm's protagonists do possess some room to manoeuvre during the development of their own compromise. In case of an internationalised company, it is possible to have a variety of compromises, depending on the host country. Nevertheless, the firm's subsidiaries must each be in control and in charge of their own production systems and markets. This is not the case when they are part of one and the same regional or global industrial complex and deliver their output to markets that change depending on the current economic situation.
Volume strategy and Fordian model
This strategy emphasises a single source of profit: economies of scale, that is, mass production for as long as possible in constantly growing markets, with a reduced number of models that are specific to each major market segment. It can only be durably relevant under two conditions: the market must be in an extension mode (either because it is in an initial equipment phase or else because it is homogenising) and comprised of two or three homogenous segments; or the labour factor must be copious and capable of being mobilised for repetitive production. These conditions presuppose a growth mode that is consumptionbased as well as a type of income distribution that is either nationally co-ordinated and highly egalitarian or else clearly stratified into two or three stable and numerically equivalent sections. As one can see, these conditions are very restrictive. No growth mode that has ever been seen in a capitalist economy has ever durably satisfied them. For these reasons, up until now the volume strategy has only been profitable during relatively shortlived initial automobile equipment phases, that is before the demand has diversified. This was the case for Henry Ford with the Model T and for Volkswagen with the Beetle (Jürgens, 2000) . The same could happen again in large emerging countries such as China or India. Certain carmakers have also been hoping that this strategy would again become appropriate if the world market's major strata were to become homogenous.
In the past, the volume strategy was implemented by means of a Fordian model that satisfied its requirements through a very limited number of standard products; an integrated productive organisation marked by flows that were continuous, rhythmic and repetitive; and an employment relationship that guaranteed workers who were lacking in the requisite skills fixed daily wages and schedules thanks to a company government compromise which was based on allowing people to accede to mass consumption in exchange for their acceptance of this type of work organisation. Any resurgence of the volume strategy probably infers the building of a new company government compromise, that is, of a new productive model. 
Volume and diversity strategy and Sloanian model
This strategy combines two sources of profits that would at first glimpse appear to be contradictory -volume and diversity. What General Motors invented during the Inter-War period was a way of overcoming this contradiction by designing different marques' car models on the basis of a single platform (at the time, the chassis) and by setting up a productive organisation and employment relationship that made it possible to manage ostensible diversity (body, internal fittings and equipment) in an economic manner (Jetin, 1999) . The volume and diversity strategy thus precludes specific models as well as models that are conceptually innovative and which are not compatible with many parts being commonalised with models from the traditional product range.
This requires a growing and moderately hierarchised market as well as a copious, polyvalent and promotable workforce. In actual fact, if the potential clienteles are to accept this superficial differentiation and deep-seated commonalisation, there cannot be any excessive economic and social differentiation between the various social categories, and social and professional mobility must have attained a certain level. Growth modes that feature a national income distribution which is nationally co-ordinated and moderately hierarchised are the ones that best fulfil such conditions. This is why a volume and diversity strategy was the most pervasive (albeit not the only) strategy during the post-war boom years. It ran into difficulties when the market entered into a product renewal phase in the countries where firms were pursuing this strategy. The indispensable economies of scale could no longer be obtained thanks to an extension of the market. However, they could be achieved by penetrating those markets that found themselves in an initial equipment phase, or else thanks to mergers and alliances with other firms. Still, certain preconditions had to be fulfilled for this to occur. Internationalisation, for example, had to involve moving into countries that possessed the same types of growth mode, and designing local models that shared the same platforms, as those that could be found in the country of origin. Mergers and alliances had to quickly lead to a commonalisation of the relevant marques' platforms. Carmakers who had developed a volume and diversity strategy during the post-war boom years, American manufacturers in particular, found it difficult to make this change (Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu and Volpato, 2000) .
The Sloanian model is named after Alfred Sloan, the former General Motors CEO who is generally deemed to have been its father. This is the model that has best been able to implement the volume and diversity strategy. Its product policy consists of offering parallel product ranges under the name of different marques. Its productive organisation is characterised by a centralisation of strategic choices and a decentralisation throughout the various divisions or subsidiaries of the responsibility for their implementation. Also featured is a flexible and polyvalent production system that makes use of componentsproducing suppliers or subsidiaries and multi-specialised assembly lines. The employment relationship emphasises polyvalency and mobility. The Sloanian model is based on a company government compromise that ensures greater growth in wages' purchasing power, as well as a career mobility that has been negotiated with one or several labour unions in exchange for social harmony and an acceptance of polyvalency. The volume and diversity strategy, and to an even greater extent the Sloanian model, became less relevant when national income distribution began to operate according to modalities that were more competitive in nature, which is to say, more individualised, based on "merit", with a local and category-specific balance of power and an emphasis on financial opportunism. However, the growing demand for distinctive products rendered the product policy less commercially palatable. Internationalisation and/or mergers/alliances became all the more essential in capturing this moderately hierarchised demand wherever it could be found (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000 a) .
1.3. A quality strategy that is still looking for a productive model
Here the word quality means not only reliability and finishing, but also and above all the social distinctiveness that the product's style, utilisation of certain materials, emphasis on finishing and marque-related prestige offers in the opinion of a privileged clientele that looks for such factors and which is in a position to pay for them. This strategy induces those firms that have adopted it to specialise in the top-of-the-range, or in recent times in the upper part of each market segment. This is why such firms are often called "specialists" as opposed to the "generalist" firms whose output targets the widest cross-section of potential consumers. Earnings basically stem from the profit margins that the product and the top-of-the-range customers allow for -the high price also acting as a means of distinction and social tiering, above and beyond any material justification.
A quality strategy is the one that features the greatest relevancy in time and in space. There are very few societies in which a small well-off section of the population is not ready to pay a high price to possess those products that can symbolise their economic and social position. For this reason, the top-of-the-range market has from the very outset been international in nature. Yet it is not an easy strategy to carry out, since the social position of the well-off and privileged classes changes over time and varies from one country to the other.
In growth modes that feature a co-ordinated and moderately hierarchised distribution, the top-of-the-range clientele is not totally cut off from other types of customers. In modes that feature a competitive type of distribution, part of the top-of-the-range clientele is in fact unstable due to the reversals in fortune that it may have experienced, such that this subsection does not have the same expectations as the well-entrenched clienteles who are completely distinct from all other market segments. In those modes that feature a highly inegalitarian type of distribution, top-of-the-range clients are basically the only customers for new vehicles, and they are very devoted to the marque's international renown and to demonstrations of their own wealth.
It is primarily for these reasons that the specialist carmakers, almost all of whom are located in Europe, have found it difficult since the War to put together a productive model that is durable, meaning one that can continually find the right balance between large series production methods and others that emphasise the product's "hand finishing" and customised qualities (Ellegard, 1995; Freyssenet, 1995) . In addition, they also find themselves forced nowadays to increase the number of models they offer, due to the social and geographic diversification of top-of-the-range demand -a consequence of the rise of the new sections of the population who have benefited from a competitive type of distribution. Lacking the means for this, certain manufacturers have preferred to be bought out by generalist carmakers.
Permanent cost reduction strategy and Toyotian model
In the strategy, costs are to be cut in all circumstances and at all times. To a certain extent, the other profit sources are no more than a complement, and even then only when they are feasible, useful and compatible. Cost reduction will always remain the prime objective when a firm envisages any situation, as no outcome is ever taken for granted. The strategy consists of lowering return costs by constant savings drives, both internally and by the suppliers. It is particularly well-suited when national growth is driven by the export of dayto-day products and when the redistribution of competitiveness gains is done in a coordinated and moderately hierarchised manner. Employees are subject to external competitiveness constraints and the volume and structure of national demand is sufficiently predictable to avoid any unforeseen and costly variations in production.
For these same reasons, this strategy, which Toyota has been pursuing since the 1950s, is not as robust as it would appear. This is because it is so demanding. The strategy struggles when sudden changes occur (related for example to shfits in demand levels or in currency parities) -changes that can in one fell swoop ruin the patient and continual efforts required of employees and suppliers, who might then be inclined to curtail their participation in the cost reduction drive, as was the case at Toyota in the early 1990s (Shimizu, 1999; .
The Toyotian model is characterised first of all by the offer of well-equipped basic products in each market segment -products that are made without any excessive novelties so as to avoid costly diversity and/or the risks that are inherent to any innovation. In addition, and as far as possible, these products are turned out in increasing quantities (Lung et. al., 1999) . A just-in-time productive organisation reveals any problems that can prevent continuous and regular flows, since this would be a source of wastage. The employment relationship and the subcontractor network induce employees and suppliers to contribute to the cost-cutting effort, the former by a wage system in which pay is predicated on the realisation of the targets that are set in this area, the latter by a choice that revolves around their commitment to the application of the same production methods as the manufacturer itself. The company government compromise in the Toyotian model focuses on the firm's longevity, job guarantees for employees and profit-sharing with subcontractors.
The requirements of the strategy and the difficulty in building a productive model to satisfy them are so daunting that Toyota has always been extremely prudent in its internationalisation efforts (Boyer et. al., 1998) . It has also been forced to make wholesale changes to its system of production, employees and subcontractors having reached the limits of what they consider to be acceptable. It has had to change its wage system, to stop asking its employees to reduce their standard working times, to make its flows "less lean" and to rearrange the production lines so as to be able to offer each work team more or less complete control over one component or operation. Not only have doubts been raised concerning the company government compromise, but its profit strategy is also experiencing problems. The rising demand for innovative products (as opposed to the traditionally hierarchised type of demand) has forced Toyota to take risks that are in contradiction with its strategy. The challenge that it seems to want to meet is to create compatibility between cost-cutting and innovation, just like General Motors once overcame the contradiction between volume and diversity.
Innovation and flexibility strategy and Hondian model
This consists of designing products that respond to new expectations and/or emerging demands; manufacturing them massively and immediately if actual orders match forecasts; or inversely abandoning them rapidly and for as little cost as possible if they fail commercially. Profits actually stem from an innovation rent that is derived from commercial relevancy -as long as this innovation is not copied. The best way of delaying this outcome is to be able to satisfy the market segment that has been created in as a short a period of time as possible. An innovation and flexibility strategy is reinforced when the needs or lifestyles of the social categories that are being targeted change periodically, or when new categories emerge, with people who are distinct at an economic and social level. This is generally what occurs in those growth modes that are marked by a competitive type of national income distribution. It is the reason why this strategy, which had become the bane of many carmakers during the post-war boom years, has again become a winner, as witnessed by the good performances of Honda, Renault and Chrysler (before the latter fell into the hands of Daimler, paradoxically to avoid a hostile takeover by American financiers).
This episode once again corroborates the necessity for firms pursuing this strategy to be financially independent. They must be entirely free to assume the risks that are inherent to conceptual innovation. They must also be free of any medium/long-term commitment to their suppliers so as to be able to change production rapidly if need be. They must have at their disposal an easily re-convertible production tool and a workforce that enables innovativeness both at the product and at the production process level. Lastly they must also possess an extremely in-depth knowledge of which customer expectations are unsatisfied and unexpressed, so as to be able to offer innovative vehicles that are commercially appropriate.
Up until now, the Hondian model, inaccurately mixed together with the Toyotian model in the lean production concept, best fulfilled the demands of an innovation and flexibility strategy. Honda was able to make great strides forward during the post-war boom years, despite the fact that this era was hardly favourable to a strategy of this nature. From the very outset, Honda looked to the international marketplace for types of clientele that would be interested by what it was offering. It set up an internal system to detect and foster innovative personalities, and a design organisation that gave them a chance to express themselves. Its production system, which had a very low level of automation, can be quickly re-converted, thanks primarily to a workforce whose responsiveness is enhanced by the firm's wage and career development systems. Honda has always refused to be a member of a keiretsu and to tie its own development to government policy, whatever this may be. The Hondian model is based on a company government compromise that stresses individual promotion, expertise and the quality of work life in exchange for the responsiveness and inventiveness that give birth to the firm's performances (Mair, 1994; .
This model has not helped Honda to become appropriately innovative in all circumstances. Mistakes were made, for example, during the first half of the 1990s, after the speculative bubble burst, with Honda having designed sporty-looking cars for young yuppies, and neglected the recreational vehicle market. However, the company's responsiveness enabled it to move into this market very quickly and to make a profit there by offering original models.
Automobile firms: drivers of regional integration?
Through the early 1990s, and in those spaces where they had already established a presence, carmakers could often be found pursuing strategies that revolved around a principle of regional integration. Our first task is to define this process. We will then demonstrate how the automobile industry has been one of its main drivers throughout the world. We will also show that such regional integration processes can occur either in proximity to the space(s) where a carmaker has already established a presence (i.e., in neighbouring countries), or else in more distant spaces (i.e., in underdeveloped countries). Finally, we will examine the factors that explain why the automobile industry often plays a leading role in these types of dynamics.
3.1. Regional integration as a means for creating a production system that is compatible with a given market's demand for automobiles
The regional integration process can be apprehended in car manufacturers' internationalisation strategies as a set of decisions that are intended as a way of articulating at a supranational (regional) level (the region) the two conditions that are a prerequisite to profitability (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000) . On one hand, the relevancy of a particular profit strategy to the modes of growth and income sharing that exist at a macro-economic level; on the other, the establishment of an enterprise government compromise.
During the Post-war boom years, this coherency was primarily manifested (in the Fordist regime and in its different variants) at a national level. Export may have constituted an indispensable complement to an automobile industry's development, but a manufacturer would mainly design and develop a range of product models with its own domestic market in mind. Moreover, the government compromises that would be negotiated by the various parties concerned by such an agreement would take place in a national context, especially since at the time very little production had been internationalised. Even those American carmakers (Ford and GM) who had already developed overseas subsidiaries during the Inter-war period reverted after the Second World War to a system based upon autonomous activities that were geared towards a distinctive national environment. The Australian, English and German subsidiaries each had their own product; and each entity was run according to specific rules of employment relationship management -rules that were a function of each subsidiary's local, national environment. As such, in Europe, Opel and Vauxhall were run independently of one another, as were Ford UK and Ford Germany (after Ford's withdrawal from Spain and France in 1954). As a matter of fact, until the end of the 1960s, the products that Ford's various subsidiaries were offering differed from one another; and on certain external markets, the entities were rivals.
At the level of the firm, the regionalisation process has not been linear -but it has been affected by the various categories of tension that can exist between homogeneity and spatial differentiation. For a regionalisation process to function, the manufacturer has to offer an identical range of models in the various countries comprising a particular region. This identical product range presupposes the relative homogeneity of these markets, and therefore a relative convergence, in terms of national income levels and modes of income sharing, and even further, in terms of people's lifestyles (rates and forms of urbanisation, level of road transport infrastructure, role of individual transportation modes, cultural representations, etc.). However, this regionalisation process cannot be limited to its commercial dimension alone: it necessarily entails a productive internationalisation, if only because of the regional division of labour that it organises. Implanting activities in a variety of different countries is tantamount to attempting to gain proximity to one's markets by building new production plants in those countries where a firm hopes to benefit from rapid market growth. This sometimes reflects a firm's response to an opportunity to get closer to the specific, design or engineering-related resources that can be embedded in territorialised industrial complexes. To a large extent, an overseas implantation of production activities (design, machining, assembly) is still motivated by the desire to benefit from spatial differentials in costs, especially labour costs (wage levels, payroll taxes, working hours and labour flexibility). What the firm is seeking to exploit is the heterogeneity of the regional space. It tries to do this by specialising its different sites in those activities that local resources (quality, costs, flexibility) are most adapted to, and by benefiting from scale economies thanks to the concentration of a specified production on each of these sites.
However, this heterogeneity is in contradiction with the alleged convergence that the markets have been going through. This contradiction is only a partial one, inasmuch as the broadening of a product range can help a car maker to offer a variety of models, with a different breakdown in each of the countries that are involved (depending on variations in demand). Indeed, the automobile industry is one sector where a differentiation of goods can be found at the very core of the competitive process. This also holds for the branch's innovation aspects, what with its ongoing creation of niches where the capture of additional profits becomes possible. As such, small cars and light utility vehicles are much more common in Southern (Spain, Portugal, Italy) than in Northern Europe, where larger sized models and top of the range vehicles predominate (see chapter on European integration).
However, the heterogeneity of regional spaces' employment relationships, especially as pertains to their wage costs, must constantly be renewed if it is to serve a dynamic function. This is because economic development has created a certain convergence between those countries that the multinational firms have been focusing on -hence a reduction in wage differentials, and a search for new peripheral spaces. For the United States, Mexico now fills the same role that Canada did 20 or 30 years ago; and for the European Union, Eastern Europe has today become a pole of attraction, taking over the role that the Iberian Peninsula had filled during the 1970s 
2.2.The automobile industry as an active participant in regional integration processes
Working in a sector that is particularly sensitive to economies of scale, and where product differentiation is a significant factor (Chanaron, Lung 1995) , carmakers have often been one of the more active pressure groups lobbying in favour of regional integration processes. There are a number of examples of this.
Free trade in North America
In North America, the 1965 Auto Pact between Canada and the United States constituted a sectorial agreement intended to consolidate and further the integration of automobile production on both shores of the Great Lakes region. American carmakers and parts makers would benefit from the lower wage costs in Canada, whose automobile market was very similar to the United States'. During the mid-1980s, certain Korean and Japanese operators would also start to see Canada as a launchpad for attacking the American market. It was at this time that a wave of investment began in Mexico, with the construction of enginebuilding plants whose production was to be exported to the United States; as well as the greenfield creation of assembly plants in Mexico's Northern states (Micchelli, 1997) . Although the Mexican automobile market had been previously protected by import substitution policies, there was shift to an export-oriented automobile policy as a result of the heavy pressure that was being exerted by the American carmakers: Mexican legislation was modified several times, leading to a relaxation of the country's control over foreign investments, as a direct result of Ford's efforts. These two waves of investment by the automobile industry were a precursor to the free-trade agreement (FTA) that was signed between Canada and United States in 1988, and extended to Mexico 4 years later, leading to the birth of NAFTA.
European integration
In the Old World, car makers moulded themselves to the extant European integration process in order to benefit from its localisation opportunities. Following the Treaty of Rome, Belgium become during the 1960s a particularly popular site for the location of assembly plants (Renault, Volvo, VW, Opel and Ford having set up operations there). Car manufacturers often anticipated and lobbied for a geographic expansion towards new spaces (England, Spain, Portugal, Eastern Europe), and for a consolidation of the economic and monetary integration that was taking place (stabilisation of currency fluctuations, Euro zone as a protection against exchange risk).
American manufacturers (Ford, GM) were the first to operate on a European-wide scale. They achieved this by integrating their English and German subsidiaries, and by moving small car assembly plants to the Iberian Peninsula. During the 1970s, those laws that relaxed the foreign investment controls that Franco had set up in Spain, and which opened this country up to the multinationals, were baptised the "Ford laws", as they had been adopted to encourage Ford to set up operations near Valencia. The American groups This strategy paid off for Ford, which became European market leader, and increased profits by so doing. In fact, in the late 1970s, Ford Europe saved the rest of the Company from bankruptcy after it had suffered major setbacks on the North American market. As for GM, once GM Europe had finally completed Opel's painful absorption of Vauxhall, the Group rose to a respectable position in the European rankings, and by the early 1980s, it was beginning to turn a profit.
Inversely, Chrysler Europe was a failure, and when the third largest American carmaker finally decided to withdraw to its domestic market, its European activities were resold to Peugeot. This acquisition allowed PSA to reach a more significant European dimensionuntil that point, the French Group's only European assets had been the Citroën factories in Spain, but with Chrysler Europe it was able to acquire a business base in Spain (Madrid) and in England (Luton). European carmakers were in fact very timid in pursuing regional integration strategies, usually limiting themselves to market access issues. With the exception of Renault (Belgium, Spain-Portugal), they tended to emphasise the consolidation of their domestic production and exportation base when building the new assembly plants that were necessitated by the market's rapid growth during the 1960s. For these reasons, the Old World's regional integration was still incomplete as the 1980s drew to a close. Most of the European automobile industry's productive base remained concentrated in carmakers' countries of origin. Even in terms of the commercial internationalisation that had taken place, market integration was still an unfinished business. It is true that the product ranges that were being offered in the different countries had already converged to a certain extent. Still, significant disparities remained in new vehicle prices, and a high percentage of automobile sales were still being achieved in a car maker's country of origin as the 1980s came to an end.
Regional integration has not been the rule everywhere
The automobile industry's integration processes may have begun in Europe and in North America as far back as the 1960s, but it is also significant that the trajectories being followed by the two newest automobile countries to have emerged over the past 25 years, Japan and South Korea, diverged markedly (cf. the two relevant chapters in this volume). Japan's and Korea's automobile industries have remained nationally-focussed yet, at the same time, largely export-oriented, in the sense that their mode of growth is geared towards exporting. It is true that the geo-political environment in this region is much more disparate than in Europe or North America (due to the conflicts caused by the presence of a number of major powers in Southeast Asia) and that Asia's level of economic development is quite heterogeneous. In addition, these are young automobile industries, who had only experienced continuous growth, at least until the early 1990s for Japan (slightly later for Korea), and automobile firms that were indigenous. In this environment, the prerequisites for a regional integration centred around these two countries do not appear to have been present, despite local carmakers' active attempts to support, and to participate in, regional integration processes on the zone's periphery.
The peri-central regional integration
In Southern Hemisphere countries, automobile firms have often driven local governments' attempts to implement forms of regional integration. In South America, there had been a number of unsuccessful initiatives in this direction before the advent of MERCOSUR, an organisation that joined Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay in an economic community. This common market changed the region's perspectives, leading Ford and Volkswagen to merge their Argentinian and Brazilian activities in 1987 into a joint venture called Autolatina. Abandoning their plans to export to the United States from a South American base, the two manufacturers refocused on the Argentinian and Brazilian markets, rationalising their productive infrastructure (including the mechanical components they traded), and harmonising their product ranges. Paradoxically, this strategy was of no benefit to VW and Ford, who saw their leadership slip away as a result of their having neglected the Brazilian market's main catalyst during the 1990s: the "popular car" (Noberto, 2000) . The association would be dissolved in 1997, and each carmaker would end up defining its own, separate strategy.
In Southeast Asia, Japanese carmakers had worked to set up a compensation system to encourage components trading between ASEAN's four main countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) -with each being able to use its particular specialisation in such a way as to benefit from economies of scale when producing the component. 1981 saw the creation, after a long period of negotiation, of an initial scheme entitled the AIC (ASEAN Industrial Corporation). This had a relatively negligible impact, unlike the 1988 Brand to Brand Compensation (BBC) agreement that encouraged mutual trading between a carmaker maker's various sites in the region's different countries. The agreement, which only applied to the automobile industry, was first adopted by Mitsubishi, followed by Toyota in 1989, Nissan a year later, and Honda in 1995 (Guiheux, Lecler, 2000) . The BBC was a great success: from 1991 to 1996, automobile production in these ASEAN countries almost doubled, rising from 762,000 to 1,450,000 units. In December 1995, regional integration reached a new plateau with the ASEAN Industrial Corporation Organisation (AICO), which broadened the range of activities covered by the previous scheme. It would appear that we are now moving towards a Customs Union type of regime (Common Effective Professional Tariff), which is due to come on-line in the year 2003 (see Shimokawa, elsewhere within the present volume). 
3. Factors driving the regional integration processes
An explanation is required both for the automobile industry's involvement in these various regional integration processes, as well as for the aforementioned diversity of manufacturers' strategies.
The explanation for the automobile firms' favourable view of the regional integration processes can be found in the rising output that has long been one of the sector's main characteristics. The search for lower production costs has lead carmakers to explore any and all size-related savings (i.e., those economies of scale and scope that can be achieved by the use of common components). Internationalisation has thus become an integral part of the industry's development, and firms are more likely than not to be in favour of open markets (this constituting the first phase of a regional integration). Trade liberalisation is seen as a key to accessing new markets, and thus to higher growth. However, this presupposes a relative homogeneity of the regional market that is being formed, i.e. a convergence between customers' expectations in the region's various countries, so that firms can propose a coherent range of identical (or minimally differentiated) models. In other words, there is a need for a certain convergence in income levels, in income distribution systems, and even in lifestyles (cultural/institutional proximity). This has been the case for most of the regional integration processes that are currently underway, in that they involve an association of countries (whether industrialised or less developed) that have attained a similar stage of development. Nevertheless, this convergence only applies to an internationalisation process's commercial aspects, that is, when there are increases in a country's exports to those countries that are located in its immediate vicinity. In the absence of any truly internationalised productive process, no real regional integration, in the true sense of the term, can be deemed to have taken place. The vertical regional division of labour phase then becomes a necessary phase, with the productive process being broken down at a region's national level through the spatial dispersion of the carmakers' and/or component makers' activities. The emergence of a regional automobile system configuration is a manifestation of actors' attempts to access specific competencies (i.e., increasing their proximity to specialised territories), and/or the attractiveness of zones that are characterised by their lower wage costs and by the greater ease with which labour flexibility can be negotiated.
Every automobile manufacturer has participated fully in this commercial internationalisation. Behaviours at the productive stage have however been more disparate, at least insofar as they are related to the regionalisation process. Certain productive models seem to have based their internal coherency on the national institutional environments within which the compromises that had comprised the same models' very foundation had first been negotiated and devised. Transferring these productive compromises to other countries can endanger their very existence (i.e., compromises with labour unions), or else necessitate a long and costly search for new and hybrid forms of coherency. Carmakers who define themselves by reference to productive models that infer a continual adjustment of a firm's various constituents (i.e., sourcing relationships) have expressed a certain aversion to productive regionalisation. Examples include the quality strategy that the specialised carmakers (BMW, Mercedes) have pursued; the Woollardian model as it has been implemented in Europe (Jaguar, Rover); and the Toyotan and Hondan models in Japan. In actual fact, the firms who have been most active in the area of regional integration are those who deem themselves to be part of a Sloanian model, starting with Ford and General Motors. Volkswagen brings a European dimension into the equation -moreover, it has concretised its preference for a Sloanian model by developing (following its purchase of SEAT and Skoda) a range of vehicles that share one and the same platform (Jürgens, 1998) .
Although the other industrial models can apply a range of product variety management modes in order to cope with market segmentation issues, the Sloanian model is particularly compatible with a process of regional integration. This is because a bigger market is a prerequisite for a broader product range -the larger the market, the easier it is to create a compatibility between a "volume-based" strategy, and a "variety-based" one. Furthermore, enterprise government compromises allow Sloanian firms to benefit from wage differentials within a given regional space, whilst maintaining the sort of adaptability that will help them to deal with a diversified group of suppliers. Another explanation lies in the organisational learning that such firms will have developed -their experience of internationalisation means that they are more capable of seizing whatever opportunities are being offered (Bordenave, Bergouignan, Lung, 2000) . This aspect demonstrates the relevance of focusing on the applicability of a Fordian model's in a regionalisation process -it only constitutes one particular, transitory form of organisation in the automobile industry; that is, one possible way in which new actors can emerge (i.e., the Korean carmakers ).
Internationalisation in a new century: between globalisation and regionalisation
At the dawn of a new century, a new and different approach should be taken to the issue of regionalisation. This must now be analysed against an overall backdrop of economic globalisation. The opening of markets to international competition and the interpenetration of the world's economies have exacerbated automobile firms' competitive rivalry, leading to a frantic search for greater price competitiveness (lower wage costs, components prices, currency rates), and for a better performance by the factors that determine other conditions of competitiveness. These include quality (in the sense of an absence of defects); product integrity; innovation; and a broader product range (in an effort to increase variety and find new profit niches). Increased volume remains the key to greater productivity, given the rising importance of scale economics for the automobile industry (especially with the jump in R&D expenditures). Hence the search for new markets, starting with emerging countries that are growing rapidly, but which are also experiencing a great deal of volatility. Pressure from the financial markets also contributes to the acceleration of these trends, especially in view of increased mergers and acquisitions activity. Anglo-Saxon capitalism's revenge against more corporatist forms of organisation, a reflection of the difficult mutations that the Japanese and German economies have been experiencing, has caused a reversal in nations' fortunes in terms of which have become the locomotives of growth: North America is going through an exceptional phase of expansion, whereas Japan has had more than a decade of stagnation, and still cannot see the light at the end of the tunnel. In this changing environment, automobile manufacturers have set off on two possible paths to internationalisation: globalisation, on one hand, and regionalisation, on the other. However, the implementation of internationalisation strategies has revealed configurations that are in fact even more complex than this.
Two scenarios
The globalisation scenario presupposes a homogenisation of the world market. This would tend to become unified through a progressive convergence of the product ranges being offered in the various countries; and through a reduction in vehicle price differentials due to the combined efforts of regulatory organisations (the European Union, the WTO) and private actors (value chain principals, e-commerce, etc.). The geographical disparity of demand would diminish, and this would encourage the greater vertical differentiation of vehicles, as well as a wider use of innovation as a source of renewable profitability niches. In a homogenous market, firms would benefit fully from the advantages of high-volume production, as sourcing would occur at a planetary level. A configuration of this sort would create the conditions for a global division of labour, enabling sites and spaces to be specialised by those activities in which they offer comparative advantages, and where they generate cross flows of goods and services -all of this in a deregulated global trade system. This presupposes a convergence between the various types of demand once the divergences between countries' level of development abated; once their different lifestyles (urbanisation, road network, etc.) had homogenised; and once their cultural references could be shared. Planetary heterogeneity would then become a simple matter of resource specificity.
However, a globalisation process of this nature would be difficult to achieve and sustain -and it is this very impracticality that renders another outcome more likely. This other scenario is based on a division of the world space into a number of regionally integrated zones. Within each of these regions, there would be a relative convergence of modes of growth and income sharing, inducing firms both to develop product ranges that would be coherent at a regional level, and also to organise a vertical regional division of labour so as to benefit from the advantages of specialisation (economies of scale, access to specific resources). If this particular regionalisation process is to see the day, governmental authorities will have to ensure that their structural policies are relatively convergent: meaning their commercial policies, but also their currency policies.
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According to certain pundits, the current phase of internationalisation is an inevitability, in that it supposedly ensures firms' survival in an environment characterised by open competition; and also because it addresses the issue of accentuated inter-company rivalries. (A situation in which, to paraphrase Michael Porter's 1986 definition of globalisation, the competitive positions of a firm in a given space depend on its presence, and on its performances, in the world's other regions). This would mean that firms have to develop regional integration strategies that not only reflect circumstances in their own domestic market, but that they would also have to set up operations in other parts of the world. In a regionalisation scenario, the first issue that would therefore have to be addressed, would involve the implications of this interdependency between a zone's various spaces. And following this line of reasoning, a simple multiregional strategy, such as the one that Ford and General Motors had adopted, respectively, in the 1960s and in the 1980s, revolving around the management of autonomous regional sub-units, would clearly be inappropriate. A firm's presence in different regions would have to be coordinated if it were to derive any benefits from its omnipresence; and if it were to improve its competitive position. In this shift to trans-regional strategy, the Sloanian model, which had seemed so efficient in our previous example, has hitherto revealed itself as a poor performer.
3.2. Globalisation at the core of strategic extremes: "volume" vs. "quality" Globalisation, when perceived as a homogenous market for a standardised product, clearly embodies the generic vision that is found at the heart of the Fordian model. During the 1910s, Henry Ford's master plan with the Model T had revolved around the production of a unique car model that could be aimed at all car markets. Inasmuch as this strategy involved a basic model, featuring a process that was standardised and therefore relatively banal, the vehicle's assembly and even its production were always likely to be dispersed in order that the Ford Motor Company could move closer to its markets. For this reason, it wasn't long before Henry Ford internationalised his production as a replacement for the direct export of vehicles from his original base in the United States (as had been the case during the 1910s-1920s, when the international trade of manufactured products was still under strict control). Plants for the assembly of the Ford Model T and its different variants were soon built in Europe (in England, as early as 1911), South America, and Japan (Wilkins, Hill, 1962) .
The Korean (Daewoo and Hyundai) carmakers' highly ambitious internationalisation drives of the early 1990s reproduced this strategy, with its main focus on the search for economies of scale. This involved one or two entry-level vehicles to target both emerging and industrialised countries (in the latter, these cars were marketed to low income households as a bottom of range models) -two markets where a low price could offset a comparatively low quality. Korean price levels for new cars are often equivalent to the prices of a top-quality second hand car. This low price is obtained by using a strategy that is primarily volume-oriented, and thus geared towards expansion into new markets. The sudden rise in the Korean automobile firms' production capacities during the 1990s also helped bring about their decline -no independent Korean carmakers have survived now that Renault has taken over Samsung, Daimler-Chrysler Hyundai and Ford Daewoo.
At the other end of the scale, top of the range vehicles, and particularly those manufacturers who have long been described as specialists, address a clientele that is solely comprised of high income households. In any country, including in a manufacturer's own domestic market, this will only represent a small volume of sales. To attain production volumes that are large enough to allow for economies of scale, carmakers pursuing qualitybased strategies have always tended to see their market as being a global one. This is feasible because of the homogeneity of a clientele that is targeted because of its level of income and cultural referents: deluxe brands (Jaguar, BMW, Mercedes, Porsche) basically have the same image across the planet. Only a small proportion of all households are concerned by this target market, a segment whose size varies from one country to the next. It is true that a number of specialised carmakers have disappeared over the past ten years, having been taken over by generalist groups (Saab by GM for example); having transformed themselves into generalist carmakers by broadening their product range downscale (BMW, Mercedes); or as a result of mergers (Chrysler/Daimler). For these prestigious marques, which automobile groups are ready to spend considerable amounts of money on (Ford paid XX million Euros to purchase Jaguar in 199x, and XX for Land Rover), the market remains a global one. In fact, it is precisely because of this homogeneity of the market, and of the brand's image, that firms feel they can justify the investments that they have been making (the goodwill they have been paying). For example, Ford grouped in a separate entity, entitled Premier Automotive, all of the marques involved in its corporate "quality" strategy: Lincoln, Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover, not to mention Aston Martin. At the same time, these marques' incorporation by a generalist group is a true reflection of the new constraints that are now associated with a process of internationalisation: the rationalised purchasing of components; shared R&D investments (i.e., Volvo's safety competency); the "commonalisation" of a certain number of electronic or mechanical components; and even the sharing of platforms. In the middle of the range, GM's global platform, with its code name Epsilon, should help with its development of one Saab model, two Opels, and several American models (ranging from Chevrolet to Saturn) that are going to hit the market starting in 2001.
The Sloanian model: between globalisation and multi-regionalisation
With the Volkswagen Group, we have another example of a globalisation strategy that has been associated with a variety-volume strategy -VW having extended its range both through vertical as well as through horizontal differentiation. The four generalist marques (Audi, Seat, Skoda, Volkswagen) have built up model ranges with shared platforms. To achieve this, they have positioned themselves in a variety of market segments (each marque being associated with a specific brand image), and broadened their individual ranges: Audi has moved downscale towards the A2 small car market, whereas, inversely, the Volkswagen marque will soon be marketing a deluxe model. These ranges are being completed by niche vehicles that have been developed on high-volume platforms (the New Beetle, the Audi TT) -and the niches that these brands had previously been serving will now be occupied by the more prestigious names (Bugatti, Lamborghini, Bentley) that VW has taken over. With all of these marques, the VW Group possesses a complete product portfolio, and now seems capable of occupying all possible segments. Depending on the local market, VW can combine its products in such a way as to propose an offering that has been adapted to the specific features of a composite consumer demand. Integrating the various spaces' heterogeneity into this formula involves a specific combination of homogeneous products that have been designed and produced for a global market. Production can be reorganised at a regional scale: in Europe, from Portugal to the Czech Republic or to Hungary -or in South America, between Argentina and Brazil. By combining economies of scale with a product variety that has been adapted to the specific offering that is to be made, this strategy would appear to be highly coherent. For the moment, it would be premature to judge its overall relevancy. We can however discuss the various ways in which it could go wrong, as well as its limitations. Past implementations of a "volume and a variety" strategy shows that there is a permanent risk of cannibalism between marques, due to an excessive coverage of markets, and to an insufficient differentiation of products. In addition, a solution that consists of compiling a local offering that reflects a product portfolio that a firm has already developed elsewhere may ultimately turn out to be poorly adapted to the needs of a particular local market. The absence of a light truck market in North America is a long-standing weakness -and there is no guarantee that people will want to continue for much longer marketing standardised vehicles to the emerging markets. VW's success in China and in South America is based on the models that it has adapted to each of these markets (the VW Santana and the VW Golf). The Brazilian example also contains significant lessons: in this country, VW was unable to benefit from an automobile policy which was aimed at encouraging the development of "carros poulares", i.e., popular cars (Noberto, 2000) -the vehicles with motors of less than one litre that had caused the explosion of the Brazilian market during the 1990s. This inability to adapt explains the decline in VW's market share in Brazil. This market's specificity ultimately convinced Volkswagen to preserve a specifically Brazilian modeland the next version of the Golf will be developed on a worldwide platform. Finally, we should not forget that despite its position as the top European in the North American market (especially in the USA and in Canada) and in Japan, VW is still only a minor player in these two poles of the Triad. The German group has a presence that is essentially biregional: Europe and the emerging countries.
The same can be said of its competitor Fiat, who, until its alliance with General Motors, had been pursuing a multi-regionalisation strategy in which the world was split up into two distinct regions: the North (primarily Europe) and the South (the emerging countries). The Italian firm has long been the most nationally-oriented of all the European carmakers, having broadened its brand portfolio on its domestic market (Fiat, Alfa, Lancia, Maserati, Ferrari) without setting up operations in the European Union's other countries (except for a brief experience in Spain, following an association with Seat). However, there have long been links with countries now deemed to be "emerging" (the USSR, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Brazil). As a result, Fiat has designed a specific model that targets these new markets: the Fiat 178, which is still at the project stage (Camuffo, Volpato, 1999) . This product offers good value for money, and will in all likelihood be able to conquer the first time buyers' market in the emerging countries. The production of this vehicle (known as the Palio) has been organised according to a division of labour between the main protagonists (Turkey, Brazil, Poland and Morocco) in a components (i.e., body parts) trade that has become widespread, and which feeds assembly and kitting plants that are spread around the planet to the tune of 700,000 to 900,000 units per annum. This is truly a world car, in that it targets all emerging markets. The Palio model and its variants are to replace Fiat models which had been mainly targeted at the European market (the Italian carmaker being almost entirely absent from North America and Japan). Without a doubt, Fiat has scored a few points, what with its adaptation to the emerging countries, and more specifically as a result of the multiple successes it has known: with the Palio (which is due to be produced in XX number of countries); with its small city cars (the Cinquecento, to be followed by the Seicento, automobiles that are being assembled in Poland and partially re-imported back into the rest of Europe); and with the breakthrough of the Uno in Brazil where, unlike VW, Fiat has been able to take advantage of the "popular car" policy.
In the Southern Hemisphere countries, Fiat has laid down a gauntlet for its competitorswho have the option of avoiding this challenge by offering extremely differentiated products, and by assembling niche vehicles in order to create new segments in these markets (i.e., Renault's choice of the Scenic monobody in Brazil). In Southeast Asia, where the Japanese have been offering "Asian cars" (models that have been adapted to local conditions), Opel has also decided to assemble a monobody model (the Zafira, in Thailand). To compete on an entry-level vehicle market where the Palio is already present, a new type of product needs to be designed -one example being the $5,000 vehicle that Renault has thought of having its Dacia marque develop. However, this focus on penetrating the emerging markets, where high levels of market volatility have added to firms' vulnerability, has been offset by a slump in Fiat's fortunes on its domestic market, and more generally, throughout Europe . Here, the Italian firm has lost a great deal of market share as a result of its ageing product range (this despite the major efforts that it has made to increase its process's competitiveness). Fiat's alliance with GM, which effectively paves the way for a takeover of the Italian firm by the American giant, sanctions to the certain extent a kind of failure -but it also opens new directions.
The difficulties associated with a strategy of trans-regionalisation
It is worthy studying the way in which the two American carmakers' (Ford and General Motors) strategies have changed, in that this allows us to apprehend firms' uncertainties regarding the global strategies they should be following. From the mid-1980s onwards, Ford pursued a strategy that was based on the concept of centres of excellence, delegating and dividing the responsibility for the renewal of its models and main mechanical systems between three poles, according to the set of competencies that each had acquired: Ford North America for large cylinder vehicles (V6 and V8 engines); automatic transmissions; and electronic components; Ford Europe for small and medium-sized cars; for four-cylinder engines; and for manual transmissions Mazda, in which Ford has a 25 % stake, and with which the Company had started up a production of small subcompact cars for the North American market (with the Escort being renovated in such a way as to approximate the 323). In addition, the Japanese partner was central to Ford's Asia-Pacific activities, a region in which most of the cars being sold under Ford's blue badge were in fact superficially changed Mazdas (the 121,the 323, and the 626). The structuring of Ford' s space had been directly based on K. Ohmae's Triad concept. In the Southern Hemisphere countries (markets that had not as of yet "emerged"), Ford arranged local collaborations, most particularly with VW in the Autolatina joint venture that had grouped the American and German companies' activities in Argentina and in Brazil. Again, the idea was to benefit from projected regional integration (MERCOSUR) by rationalising all of the two carmakers' activities. These initiatives were subsequently altered or abandoned en route. The Ford 2000 project, first announced in 1993, has been an attempt to overcome Ford's regional structures (FoE in Europe and NAAO in North America) through a global integration of activities. It is true that the initial results of the global platforms concept that had been developed as an extension of the poles of responsibility strategy have been unsatisfactory, certainly as pertains to the small car market. The Escort (Lynx in North America), developed on the Mazda 323's platform, has not achieved the results that had been hoped for; and Europe is now assuming responsibility for the development of a new platform to build the Focus and replace the Escort on both sides of the Atlantic. In the lower mid-range, the first transatlantic (global) platform to have been designed in Europe has given birth to the Mondeo, and to its equivalent(s) in North America (the Contour/Mystique) -where it has not been as successful as expected. Finally, the upscale model that was supposed to be developed in North America to replace the Scorpio, or at least its design, has turned out to be stillborn. The Ford Scorpio will not be replaced by a top of the range Ford Europe product: instead, a Lincoln, a Volvo or a top of the range U.S. Ford model will occupy this segment. In addition, Ford has not obtained the success it was hoping for in producing/assembling its small European model, the Fiesta, in Brazil or in India. In South America, Autolatina's break-up has meant that where hybrid Ford-Volkswagen models had previously been involved, each of the partners will now be refocusing on its own core product ranges. However, the two carmakers have been unable to benefit from the opportunities that have been created by the Brazilian market's takeoff, itself due to the advent of the popular car. Their profits have slumped -especially Fiat's. In India, Ford's products have also been too expensive, and the American carmaker has ended up developing a model that is more basic, and which specifically targets the emerging markets. As for Mazda, Ford has effectively taken control by raising its stake to 33.3 % -however, the Japanese firm's recovery is occurring without any input from Ford, and it can even be said that the two companies are in the process of breaking off relations: witness the abandonment of the Ford U.S. products that had been developed on a Japanese platform (the Pride/121, the Escort/323, and the Probe/626); the much too small production of the 121, supposedly derived from the European Ford Fiesta, etc. The very idea of having Mazda run Ford's presence in Asia-Pacific has now been put in doubt. The role of a Japanese partner in Ford's global strategy, 25 years after the agreement was first signed, has still not been clearly established.
All in all, the outcome of Ford's internationalisation strategy, as implemented over the past decade, has been far from brilliant. Market share in Europe has slumped; Mazda has continued to decline in Japan and across the world; and a market leading position has been lost in both the Australian and the Brazilian markets. Far from generating additional profits, Ford's international activities have damaged the Group's profitability. Ford's record earnings are essentially due to two explanatory factors: the Group's financial activities; and its light trucks sales on its domestic market (Froud et al., 2000) . In an environment such as the one that it is now facing, Ford's executives have had to take strong actions, re-creating Ford Europe, and cutting costs dramatically. The race to globalise has been a failure, and regionalisation is again becoming the core of the American firm' s policy.
Regionalisation is also at the heart of the strategy that the market leader, General Motors, has been following. One of the major reasons behind this turnaround is the confusion that reigned for a while between GM Europe (Opel) and GM International -a conflict that caused the Group's senior management a great deal of distress. GM International was transferred to Detroit; GM Europe/Opel refocused on the European market; and everyone was able to get a clearer picture of their own role. A certain crossflow began to take place between the two sides of the Atlantic, and the newer platforms (first launched in 1996) have finally reached maturity. This should allow the Group to devise specific models for its three market categories: North America, Europe and the emerging countries. The design of a platform to build a medium-sized car (the Epsilon) appears to have achieved the results that had been hoped for; a dozen or so models are going to be developed from this base, and they will marketed starting in 2001. It should however be noted that someone along the way, GM has abandoned its global small car Delta project platform, the Group having decided to fall back on less ambitious local solutions.
The increased number and intensity of GM's alliances has also created new problems. The American' manufacturer's greater stake in Japanese carmakers such as Suzuki, Fuji Heavy and Subaru have provided it with access to Southeast Asia (in an approach reminiscent of Ford's with Mazda). In addition, this will help GM to broaden its portfolio of models (adding small city cars, for example), especially in the emerging markets. Cross shareholdings between GM and Fiat should lead to a rationalisation of Fiat's and Opel's activities in Europe, with mechanical systems (mostly engines), purchasing, and even platforms being shared in an effort to devise a range of specific models for the Groups' various marques. In the United States, GM is used to creating a range of models for its different marques (Buick, Cadillac, Oldsmobile, etc.) , and a question must be raised as to the reasons for this policy's lack of success in Europe. In any event, these alliances cast doubts over the role of GM's German subsidiary, Opel, which finds itself in the emerging countries in direct competition with its Japanese cousins (where it had been market leader); and which is now a rival of its Italian cousin (Fiat) in the European market. All in all, platform sharing is not a foregone conclusion for Opel's and Fiat's niche vehicles. A regionalisation process must be done and re-done over and over again...
The very recent association between Renault and Nissan appears to be moving towards a regionalisation scheme that reproduces its precursors: a division of roles amongst the world's various regions according to the competencies and advantages that each has acquired. Renault is to be leader in Europe (absorbing the Japanese firm's activities there) and in the emerging countries (outside of Asia); and it will find shelter behind its partner in Asia-Pacific and in North America. Renault's potential conflicts with its other partners are being kept under wraps for the moment, with the Korean firm Samsung relying on Nissan's technologies, and with Dacia in Romania undergoing a thorough restructuring. The new configuration might allow the Group to finally complete a project that it had first announced in the early 1990s, what with Nissan's attempt to offer a specific product range in each of the Triad's three poles. This product range is based on variants of three basic models, and on the development of a specific model in the emerging markets. For Nissan, as for the two major Americans, a "volume and diversity" strategy, when extended to an international level, has had problems taking root.
3.5. The progressive internationalisation of the Hondian and Toyotian models: has glocalisation been a success?
In terms of the internationalisation of its production, Honda has set the pace for the other Japanese carmakers. Intense domestic market competition has lead Japanese carmakers to increase the number of models they offer. This has caused an excessive proliferation of models . However, on their overseas markets, and especially in America and Europe, the Japanese have been successful offering a reduced number of models (the Honda Civic and Accord, the Nissan Sunny and Primera, the Toyota Corolla and Camry), many of which have been specifically designed with these external markets in mind. Honda's late entry into the passenger car market translates its attempt to base its growth on a significant North American presence. The first Japanese carmaker to have built an assembly plant in the United States, today Honda owns a very well-balanced productive apparatus (a styling centre, Product and Process design activities, mechanical systems factories and assembly plants serving its production requirements, a distribution network). In the mid-1990s, regional divisions were set up and allocated the task of co-ordinating all of these activities in North America, Europe and Asia. These divisions were required to act in such a way as to support the local production of models that had been specifically designed for a regional market, but which shared platforms and other systems with models from other regions. This was a clearly affirmed regionalisation initiative, and was translated by the famous neologism "glocalisation", coined by Honda's chairman, along with another rather successful slogan: "Think Globally, Act Locally". A book by Jones, Womack and Roos (1990) even views the Honda as the very model of an internationalising firm -an incarnation of the MRM (MultiRegional Motors).
Honda and Toyota have been better than their rivals in adapting to the changes that have affected the American market. They have achieved this by taking over from the Ford Taurus as leader in the compact car segment (Honda Accord/Toyota Camry). Note however that Honda was not totally on board for the "second market" (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000) : in 1999, only 14% of its sales in the United States were in the light trucks market, against 40% for Toyota. It would appear that Honda relied too much during the 1990s on the existence of a me-too behaviour in the North America market, gearing its developmental resources toward segments with little promise (i.e., its building of an estate/station wagon version of the Accord). It also neglected market opportunities/niches such as the minivan and the recreational vehicle. All in all, Honda lost some of its identity as an innovator. Inasmuch as it was not capable of transplanting its innovation aptitudes to the United States, as it had done in Europe, the firm displayed a remarkable degree of flexibility when it was able, for a few months at least, to launch products that were adapted to its new circumstances. Paradoxically, Toyota also began to display a great deal of innovativeness (the RAV4, large pickups) whilst fighting to gain a foothold in the high-volume mid-range segment -its productive model, even when hybridised by the local environment, working well in this area. Toyota took over from Honda as the top Japanese carmaker in the USA and could take 10% of the market share in 1991. Its controlled growth in Europe (with the opening of a new assembly plant in France in 2001) and continued strength in Asia (i.e., it is the top producer in Australia) appears to validate the concept of a progressive internationalisation strategy in which a regional configuration (in Europe, North America and Southeast Asia) is articulated together with a locally adapted product range, even as it spills over into other regional markets. This organises a division of labour at an intra-and inter-regional level without weakening a central pole's authority.
Conclusion
Although a logic of production (economies of scale) has induced automobile manufacturers to extend their area of commercialisation on a global scale, it is in their articulation with a market, their getting into sync with a demand, that they have incorporated the regional tier as a level at which they can achieve a certain coherency. Except for the two extremes of the scale (bottom of the range/prestige automobiles), there are limits to the homogenisation of global demand, and the failure of Ford's attempt to integrate its activities globally shows that automobile firms should be looking for more appropriate strategies -and above all, for models or innovative forms of organisation that are better adapted to a particular regional space. It is not at all certain that the real challenge is to be the first to globalise -monoregional strategies (such as the one that PSA has pursued), bi-regional, multi-regional, even trans-regional strategies, all can be relevant at a certain time, and in a given space. Is it possible to devise a productive model that allows for a combination of all of these strategies (mono-regional for certain products; multi-regional for partially overlapping market segments; global for homogenous segments)? A certain number of carmakers seem to be looking in this direction -starting with Ford, where this approach has been broken down into light trucks in the US; Focus-type world platforms for high-volume models; and the Premier Automotive group for deluxe marques. Others having started down this road include Toyota (mini city cars in Japan; Corolla/Prisma in their regional variants; and the Lexus group) or Volkswagen. To function, internationalisation strategies must incorporate a regional level; and develop enterprise government compromises that enable firms to operate in this type of combinatory register whilst avoiding the incompatibilities and incoherencies that have so often been a source of tension in the past.
